Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening? by Sampson, Rachelle & Shi, Yuan
 
543 
Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening? 
Rachelle Sampson* & Yuan Shi** 
INTRODUCTION 
The rise in quarterly capitalism in corporate America—increased 
pressure to meet quarterly earnings predictions and cater to shareholder 
preferences for short-term returns—has gained significant coverage in the 
business world and popular press in recent years.1 Increasingly, popular 
opinion suggests that firms bow to shareholder pressures, taking steps to 
smooth earnings and boost share prices in the short-term; firms do so by 
cutting Research and Development (R&D) investment, engaging in 
extensive cost-cutting, or increasing dividends and share buybacks.2 As 
Laurence Fink notes: 
[I]n the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away 
from investing in the future growth of their companies. Too 
many companies have cut capital expenditure and even increased 
debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks . . . . [W]hen 
done for the wrong reasons and at the expense of capital investment, 
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[returning cash to shareholders] can jeopardize a company’s ability 
to generate sustainable long-term returns. 3 
These observations suggest that firms are engaged in behavior 
intended to boost share prices in response to increasingly impatient 
shareholders. Evaluating whether investor time horizons are, in fact, 
shifting is of critical importance not only to firms but to the economy as a 
whole. Short-termism has been called “one of the greatest threats to 
America’s enduring prosperity.”4 
Recent estimates at the industry level show that investor discount 
rates have increased in recent years, supporting the notion that short-
termism is on the rise.5 However, we do not have evidence at the firm level 
documenting whether and how market discounting is changing over time 
or how such discounting differs between firms according to firm behavior 
and characteristics. A recent article by Sampson and Shi estimates market 
discounting at the firm level as a proxy for investor time horizons, which 
not only reveals how time horizons have changed but also how they vary 
between firms.6 Below, we discuss some observations on changing 
investor behavior, followed by a review of the evidence presented by 
Sampson and Shi. We conclude with a brief evaluation of why increased 
market discounting suggests that investor time horizons are shortening as 
well as what this means for firms. 
I. RECENT CHANGES IN INVESTOR IDENTITY AND BEHAVIOR 
Investor characteristics appear to have changed significantly over the 
past decades, both in terms of the identity of the investors themselves as 
well as their behavior. Since 1950, a massive shift has taken place where 
many institutional owners have replaced direct, retail holdings of shares; 
in 1950, ninety-two percent of shares were held by individual investors, 
and by 2006, that number had declined to thirty-two percent. Institutional 
ownership climbed from eight percent to sixty-eight percent over the same 
time period.7 At the same time, holding periods for shares collapsed from 
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the average of seven years in 19408 to seventeen weeks in 2015.9 
Shortening holding periods will likely result in greater impatience for 
returns; however, some institutional investors are more patient than others 
and the effect of institutional investors on discounting may hinge on such 
behavioral differences. 
Bushee categorizes institutional investor behavior into three main 
groups: dedicated (investors with concentrated holdings and low 
turnover), transient (characterized by high turnover and diversification), 
and quasi-indexers (widely diversified holdings but lower turnover).10 
Higher turnover generally puts greater short-term pressure on firms. 
Bushee shows that firms held by more transient institutional investors are 
more likely to cut R&D spending in order to make earnings targets; this 
translates into lower firm value in long-term earnings.11 In contrast, when 
held by more dedicated institutional investors, firms are less likely to make 
such cuts in spending to meet analyst expectations for earnings.12 Sampson 
and Shi also report that the composition of institutional owners has 
changed drastically over time: in 1981, dedicated and transient investors 
each made up about fourteen percent of institutional owners, while in 
2013, transient owners composed thirty-three percent of such investors 
and dedicated owners constituted only three percent of such investors.13 
These fundamental shifts in investor identity and behavior to favor 
more short-term holdings have direct implications for firm behavior. Firm 
executives are increasingly paid via stock-based compensation, the value 
of which depends critically on share price. This is one of the most direct 
mechanisms that investors can use to influence firm behavior and strategy. 
Despite this identified link between investor preferences and firm 
behavior, we lack a more direct measure of how markets discount firms 
and whether this shows shifting investor time horizons. Sampson and Shi 
identify such a measure, estimate the link with firm characteristics, and 
discuss why such a measure captures investor time horizons.14 
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II. ESTIMATING MARKET DISCOUNTING: A LINK WITH INVESTOR 
TIME HORIZONS 
To capture investor time horizons, Sampson and Shi adapt the market 
discounting measure used by Davies and others.15 This measure is based 
on a capital asset pricing model of stock prices, whereby stock price is 
modeled as a function of expected future dividends and a terminal stock 
price and discounted by variables capturing the cost of capital—
specifically, the risk-free interest rate and company-specific risk premium. 
In essence, the measure is an evaluation of a stock as investment, assuming 
(in the case of Sampson and Shi) that the stock is held for five years and 
then sold at the end of the investment period. Traditional finance models 
hold that present stock prices are not only a reflection of past firm 
behavior, but expectations for the future in terms of dividends and stock 
price appreciation. A market discount factor is added to this traditional 
asset pricing model. If there is no additional discounting by the market 
over and above the firm’s cost of capital, then the market discount factor 
should be equal to one. Sampson and Shi estimate this market discount 
factor using information on all firms listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ exchange over the years from 1980 to 2013 
(inclusive).16 A non-linear random coefficient model is used in order to 
generate firm-specific estimates of market discounting over time. 
Sampson and Shi transform this variable postestimation so that higher 
values represent greater market discounting of firms.17 
Results from this estimation display several striking trends. First, 
market discounting shows some volatility over time, particularly around 
market-wide financial shocks such as the dot-com bubble and financial 
crisis of 2007–2008. Market discounting also demonstrates an 
unequivocal rise over time. Several alternative measures and robustness 
checks confirm this trend. To ensure that this rise is not simply an artifact 
of shifting composition of listed firms on the U.S. stock exchanges, 
Sampson and Shi also graph within firm movement of market discounting 
over time;18 this graph reveals that market discounting not only increased 
market-wide over 1980 to 2013 but also increased within firms for the vast 
majority of the sample.19 
An examination of market discounting across industries reveals 
similar patterns, but interestingly also reveals significant between-firm 
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heterogeneity.20 To explore this heterogeneity and corroborate market 
discounting as a proxy for time horizons, Sampson and Shi estimate the 
relationship between a firm’s discount by the market and that firm’s 
behavior and characteristics.21 Specifically, the market discount is 
regressed on measures capturing past firm investment behavior, ownership 
by different types of institutional investors, and other measures capturing 
the market’s short-term pressures on firms.22 These measures represent 
proxies identified by earlier research that are correlated with firm 
investment horizons and behavior. 
Results from Sampson and Shi’s estimation show that market 
discounting is strongly correlated in expected ways with these variables.23 
Firm investments in research and development as well as capital 
equipment are typically characterized by longer-term payoffs and, thus, 
signal a more distant investment horizon. Consistent with this logic, such 
investments are negatively correlated with market discounting.24 In 
contrast, a firm’s market discount is positively correlated with its transient 
institutional investor holdings, but negatively correlated with its dedicated 
holdings. These results are as projected: institutional owners that hold 
shares for longer periods of time place less pressure on firms to generate 
short-term returns. Other previously identified measures to capture 
external pressures on firms to generate short-term returns include the 
extent of analyst coverage, the threat of shareholder activism, and the 
firm’s earnings response coefficient (i.e., how responsive the firm’s stock 
price is to earnings announcements). These variables are all positively 
correlated with a firm’s market discount, as anticipated. Overall, Sampson 
and Shi interpret these consistent correlations as evidence that market 
discounting does embody time horizons.25 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF SHORTENING INVESTOR TIME HORIZONS 
As previously discussed, market discounting reflects past firm 
behavior and future expectations for performance, as well as preferences 
around firm actions. Sampson and Shi highlight a number of firm 
examples to illustrate this point. Some firms, such as Ericsson, are heavily 
discounted by the market for R&D investments of a type that are 
disapproved of by analysts; these analysts opined that Ericsson was “doing 
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too many things” and was spread too thin.26 Microsoft, in contrast, also 
invested significant sums in R&D but was much less discounted by the 
markets.27 Several other examples demonstrate how market discounting 
encompasses investor preferences for firm behavior. While these 
anecdotes explain firm heterogeneity in market discounting, they do not 
explain the market-wide trends. 
Sampson and Shi also propose several systemic, market-wide factors 
that affect how investors discount firms.28 These factors are likely linked 
to rising uncertainty and compressed cycles of investment and production 
in the market, resulting from increased firm exposure to globalization, 
rapid technological change, and market-wide financial shocks. In light of 
these overall trends, it may be rational for investors to prefer short-term 
returns over more uncertain, longer-term payoffs. However, given the 
ability of investors to pressure firms via influence over share price, it 
becomes critically important that investor time horizons match what is 
optimal for firms. 
Empirical evidence reveals the issues that arise when firms bow to 
market pressures. Survey-based and larger-scale empirical evidence from 
other studies show that managers will forgo profitable investments29 and 
cut R&D30 to smooth earnings. Firms may invest less in durables when 
they have extensive analyst coverage, which makes stock prices more 
volatile and responsive to news.31 If investment options are not transparent 
to the market, firms have been found to cater to shareholder preferences 
and invest suboptimally.32 Firms have also failed to make necessary 
investments in response to industry technological shifts in order to 
conform to analyst expectations.33 
The research above highlights that, for some firms, rising investor 
impatience can lead to suboptimal firm investment. However, for other 
firms, pressure to generate short-term returns is an important discipline to 
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constrain the firm from unprofitable and opportunistic investments.34 The 
question then becomes how to evaluate the market-wide upward shift in 
discounting identified by Sampson and Shi. Since Sampson and Shi 
observe that market discounting is increasing for the vast majority of firms 
listed on U.S. stock exchanges, it seems likely that, for at least some firms, 
an appropriate match between investor and firm investment time horizons 
will not be had. This may lead not only to potential underinvestment in 
critical factors for firm and economic growth, but also to changes in the 
character of investment, where, for example, firms outsource research 
instead of conduct research in-house. This outsourcing behavior has 
proved less beneficial to the firm than internally conducted research and 
development in terms of contributions to firm productivity.35 
CONCLUSIONS 
Sampson and Shi demonstrate (via numerous empirical tests) that 
market discounting is rising—a signal that investor time horizons are 
indeed shrinking. These results have been highlighted in recent debates on 
the extent to which short-termism exists36 and how it affects the 
economy.37 While interpreting shortening investor time horizons as 
detrimental to all firms is overly simplistic, Sampson and Shi’s analysis 
reveals that shrinking time horizons are so ubiquitous in the financial 
market that they warrant questions over whether public firms are facing 
undue pressures to generate short-term returns.38 
  The results presented may help explain declining research and 
development productivity39 as well as stagnant total factor productivity 
growth.40 Concurrent shortening of investor time horizons suggests, in 
part, that underlying these trends is under-investment or otherwise 
suboptimal investment by firms; this can include reduced investments in 
worker training, new manufacturing equipment, and development of the 
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next great product or service that will generate returns for years to come. 
The implications are difficult to understate since productivity undergirds 
economic growth and standards of living. As such, Galston and Kamarck 
argue that “[a]s the growth of the U.S. workforce slows dramatically, 
economic growth will depend increasingly on improved productivity, 
most of which comes from raising capital investment per worker. Failing 
to make productivity-enhancing capital investments will doom our 
economy to a new normal of slow growth.”41 
Ultimately, Sampson and Shi provide one of the first market-wide 
assessments of firm level discounting with direct implications for investor 
time horizons. Naturally, additional work across disciplines is required to 
triangulate this pattern and to offer richer context for understanding the 
full implications. By documenting and corroborating such a persistent 
trend in investment horizons, we hope to engage academic researchers, 
business leaders, and policymakers in broader dialogues on why our 
concept of time is changing and what the implications for our economy 
may be. 
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